Enhancing the Activity of the DLPFC with tDCS Alters Risk Preference without Changing Interpersonal Trust by Haoli Zheng et al.
ORIGINAL RESEARCH
published: 09 February 2017
doi: 10.3389/fnins.2017.00052
Frontiers in Neuroscience | www.frontiersin.org 1 February 2017 | Volume 11 | Article 52
Edited by:
Daria Knoch,
University of Bern, Switzerland
Reviewed by:
Bernhard Hommel,
Leiden University, Netherlands
Roberta Sellaro,
Leiden University, Netherlands
*Correspondence:
Daqiang Huang
hdqjerry@zju.edu.cn
Specialty section:
This article was submitted to
Decision Neuroscience,
a section of the journal
Frontiers in Neuroscience
Received: 19 August 2016
Accepted: 24 January 2017
Published: 09 February 2017
Citation:
Zheng H, Wang S, Guo W, Chen S,
Luo J, Ye H and Huang D (2017)
Enhancing the Activity of the DLPFC
with tDCS Alters Risk Preference
without Changing Interpersonal Trust.
Front. Neurosci. 11:52.
doi: 10.3389/fnins.2017.00052
Enhancing the Activity of the DLPFC
with tDCS Alters Risk Preference
without Changing Interpersonal Trust
Haoli Zheng 1, 2, Siqi Wang 1, Wenmin Guo 1, Shu Chen 1, Jun Luo 2, Hang Ye 1, 2 and
Daqiang Huang 1*
1 School of Economics and Interdisciplinary Center for Social Sciences, Zhejiang University, Hangzhou, China, 2 School of
Economics, Center for Economic Behavior and Decision-making, Neuro & Behavior EconLab, Zhejiang University of Finance
and Economics, Hangzhou, China
Interpersonal trust plays an essential role in economic interactions and social
development. Extensive behavioral experiments have examined the nature of trust,
particularly the question of whether trusting decisions are connected to risk preferences
or risk attitudes. Various laboratory observations have been reported regarding the
difference between trust and risk, and neural imaging studies have demonstrated that the
right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (rDLPFC) is more activated when individuals decide
to trust other human beings compared with individuals decide to invest in a non-social
risk condition. Moreover, the rDLPFC has been found to exhibit an intimate relationship
with risk preference in previous neuroscience studies. However, the causal relationship
between the rDLPFC and trust has rarely been revealed. Whether modulating the
excitability of the rDLPFC, which shares roles in both trust and risk decisions, alters the
trust or risk preference of participants remains unknown. In the present study, we aimed
to provide evidence of a direct link between the neural and behavioral results through
the application of transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS) over the rDLPFC. We
found that activating the rDLPFC altered the risk preferences of our participants, whereas
no such significant effect over interpersonal trust was observed. Our findings indicate
that enhancing the excitability of the rDLPFC using tDCS leads to more conservative
decision-makings in a risk game, and this effect is specific to non-social risk rather than
social-related trust.
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INTRODUCTION
Interpersonal trust plays an essential role in economic interactions and social development (Zak
and Knack, 2001; Guiso et al., 2004). Economists have debated for the nature of trust, particularly
the question of whether trusting decisions are connected to risk preferences or risk attitudes.
Laboratory and field experiments frequently apply the trust game to measure the interpersonal
trust of participants. The trust game is occasionally called the investment game and is considered
to involve risk-taking attitudes because many scientists have noted that the trust measured in the
trust game might be confounded by an individual’s risk preference (Karlan, 2005; Kosfeld et al.,
2005; Fehr, 2009). Cook and Cooper (2003) argued that trust behavior can be clearly viewed as
the trustor’s risk taking choices. Because it is important to know whether trust can be predicted
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by risk attitude, extensive laboratory experiments have
focused on the distinction between trust and risk, and
various observations have been revealed. A large body of
laboratory evidence has demonstrated that trust and risk are
entirely different concepts with various distribution patterns in
participants, whereas relatively few studies have discovered a
positive relationship between risk and trust. Eckel and Wilson
(2004) found no statistical relationship between behavioral risk
measures and the decision to trust, and Houser et al. (2010)
revealed that trust decisions are not tightly connected to a
person’s risk attitudes. Fetchenhauer and Dunning (2012) argued
that varying the chance of repayment for trust could test the
notion that trust behavior is not about risk-taking and added
compelling evidence to previous results. In contrast, Schechter
(2007) and Qin et al. (2011) found that behavior in the trust game
is related to the actual risk-taking of participants in a non-social
setting, but both of these authors measured the participants’ risk
preferences with dice rolling rather than measuring risk-taking
behavior in a risk game that mimics the form of the trust game.
Neuroscience studies have also indicated neural differences
between trust and risk-taking behaviors. In a functional magnetic
resonance imaging (fMRI) experiment, McCabe et al. (2001)
reported that the prefrontal regions aremore active when subjects
are playing with human counterparts than when playing with
a computer, which represents non-social risk-taking condition.
Aimone et al. (2014) provided evidence in an fMRI study that
the right anterior insular cortex, as well as the medial frontal
cortex and the right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (rDLPFC), are
more activated when participants play with humans in a trust
game than when they play against a computer mediator in a
risky decision game. Specifically, when considering trust and risk
separately, the behavior of the trustor has been replicated across
a large number of neuroscience studies, which indicates that the
neural basis of trust lies in the activities of the prefrontal regions,
striatum, amygdala, cingulate cortex, paracingulate cortex, and
ventromedial prefrontal cortex (see Tzieropoulos, 2013 for a
review). Transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS) studies
revealed that modulating the activity of several brain regions
such as the orbitofrontal cortex, dorsolateral prefrontal cortex
(DLPFC), or ventromedial prefrontal cortex may alter the
participants’ trustworthiness (Nihonsugi et al., 2015; Wang et al.,
2016; Zheng et al., 2016). Moreover, numerous brain imaging
studies have revealed the relationship between risk and the
DLPFC. Because previous brain imaging studies seem to indicate
that trust and riskmay share the same brain region of the DLPFC,
these fMRI studies have failed to demonstrate a direct causal
link between the neural activities in these brain regions and trust
behaviors. A causal relationship between the DLPFC and risk has
been revealed in many transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS)
and tDCS studies through repeated gambling games (Knoch
et al., 2006; Fecteau et al., 2007a,b; Boggio et al., 2010; Ye
et al., 2015a,b). However, previous tDCS studies appling bilateral
stimulation over the DLPFC failed to demonstrate the roles of
the right and left DLPFC play in risk preference respectively.
Crucially, the question of whether modulating the activities of
the brain regions that are involved in both trust and risk, such as
the rDLPFC, can influence both the interpersonal trust and risk
preference of participants measured in economic interactions
remains unknown. The question of whether trust is a certain kind
of risk behavior has rarely been discussed in previous TMS or
tDCS studies either.
In the current study, we applied midline bipolar non-balanced
tDCS (see Nasseri et al., 2015; Sellaro et al., 2016 for different
types of tDCS montages) over the rDLPFC to determine whether
modulating the excitability of this brain area that is closely
related to both trust and risk can directly influence participants’
trust in a trust game as well as altering their risk preferences
as measured in a risk game. After receiving tDCS stimulation
(anodal, cathodal, or sham), the participants were required to
complete decision-making tasks that included a trust game and
a risk game. We performed the risk game following the design
of Houser et al. (2010), and the form of the game was identical
to the form of the trust game. The only difference between
the trust and risk games was that the repayment decision was
determined by human beings in the former and by a computer
in the latter. Comparisons of the trust investments in the trust
game between different tDCS stimulations may reveal a causal
relationship between the excitability of the rDLPFC and the
interpersonal trust of the participants. Furthermore, to add
evidence regarding the question of whether trust is closely related
to risk-taking decisions, we measured the participants’ risk-
taking preferences with a risk game and analyzed the correlation
of trust and risk in the three stimulation groups. Moreover, if
significant differences in our participants’ behaviors between the
different stimulations are observed in the risk gamewhen no such
influence of tDCS stimulation is discovered in the trust game,
we would demonstrate that modulating the excitability of certain
neural areas (such as the rDLPFC) might be specifically related to
non-social risk rather than interpersonal trust.
EXPERIMENT 1
Materials and Methods
Subjects
Ninty right-handed healthy subjects (mean age 21.36 years,
ranging from 17 to 30 years; 46 females) with no history of
neurological or psychiatric problems participated in the study
for payment. All of the participants were naïve to tDCS and
the trust and risk games, had normal or corrected-to-normal
vision, and provided written informed consent. The protocol
was approved by the Zhejiang University ethics committee.
The entire experiment lasted approximately 60 min, and each
participant received a payment of approximately 53.3 RMB yuan
(approximately 8.076 US dollars) on average after completing
their tasks. No participants reported any adverse side effects
related to pain on the scalp or headaches after the experiment.
tDCS
In tDCS, a weak direct current is applied to the scalp via
two saline-soaked surface sponge electrodes (35 cm2). The
current is constant and delivered by a battery-driven stimulator
(NeuroConn, Germany). The current was adjusted to induce
cortical excitability in the target area without any physiological
damage to the participant. Various configurations of the
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current have various effects on cortical excitability. Generally
speaking, anodal stimulation enhances cortical excitability,
whereas cathodal stimulation reduces the cortical excitability
(Nitsche and Paulus, 2000).
The participants were randomly assigned to receive anodal
tDCS over the rDLPFC (n = 30, 15 females, mean age = 21.37),
cathodal tDCS over the rDLPFC (n = 30, 15 females, mean age
= 21.43) or sham stimulation (n = 30, 16 females, mean age =
21.27). There was no significant age difference between the three
groups [F(2, 87) = 0.036, p = 0.964, ηp
2
= 0.001]. For anodal
stimulation, the anodal electrode was placed over the rDLPFC,
at the F4 position according to the international EEG 10/20
system, whereas the cathodal electrode was placed over the visual
cortex at the Oz (Colzato et al., 2015; Nihonsugi et al., 2015).
For cathodal stimulation, the cathodal electrode was placed over
the F4, whereas the anodal electrode was placed over the Oz
(Figures 1, 2). For sham stimulation, the procedures were the
same, but the stimulation was turned off after 30 s without the
participants’ knowledge. The participants may have felt the initial
itching, but there was actually no current for the rest of the
stimulation. This method of sham stimulation has been shown to
be reliable (Gandiga et al., 2006). The current was constant and of
2 mA in intensity, with a 30 s ramp up and down; the safety and
efficiency of this stimulation have been demonstrated in previous
studies. Before the decision making tasks, the laboratory assistant
put a tDCS device on the participant’s head for stimulation. After
20 min of stimulation, the tDCS device was taken off and the
participant was then asked to complete two economic interaction
games.
Task and Procedure
After the participants received tDCS stimulation for 20min
(midline bipolar non-balanced stimulation, single-blinded,
sham-controlled), they completed two economic decision tasks
programmed by z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). To eliminate the
sequence effect of the two tasks, we randomly assigned half of
the participants performed the trust game first, and the other
half performed the risk game first. Because social interaction
experiments, such as the trust game, dictator game, public good
game and ultimatum game, require the simultaneous interaction
of a number of subjects to eliminate the participants’ suspicion
regarding whether they are playing with a real person, which
may alter their behaviors (Frohlich et al., 2001), we managed
10 participants in the same laboratory during an experimental
session. These participants were anonymous to each other and
in separate cubicles.
Trust game
The trust game followed the classical design originally utilized by
Berg et al. (1995). There are two roles in the trust game: trustor
and trustee. Each role is offered a certain original endowment (for
example: ten tokens). First, the trustor decides on an amount to
transfer to the trustee. Next, the transferred amount is tripled and
the trustee decides how much of the tripled amount to transfer
back to the trustor. For example, if the amount being transferred
by the trustor is X and the amount being transferred back by the
trustee is Y, then the trustor will receive 10−X+Y, and the trustee
will receive 10+3X−Y.
In our trust game task, after the participants passed two profit-
calculating questions to ensure that they fully understood the
trust game, each participant playing role A (trustor) decided
how much of the original endowment (10 tokens) to transfer
to the other participant playing role B (trustee). Subsequently,
each participant was asked to estimate the amount send back
by her partner in each possible conditions, and each correct
estimation (when the difference between the estimation and the
FIGURE 1 | Schematic and locations of the electrode positions. (A) Schematic of the electrode positions F4 and Oz based on the international EEG 10-20
system. (B) Locations of the rDLPFC (F4) and the visual cortex (Oz) of the human brain.
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FIGURE 2 | The stimulation modes of tDCS treatments. Electric field simulations were performed with the Neuroelectrics Instrument Controller software (version
1.3, Spain). Simulated field intensity is indicated by the color bar. The axis represents the range of input voltage from −18.140 to 18.306V.
partner’s choice is less than or equal to 1) was rewarded with
one extra token. Our participants also made decisions when
playing the role of the trustee but only the data in the role of
trustor were analyzed in the current study. We used the strategy
method that the trustees had to decide on a contingent action for
every possible amount sent by the trustors (Figure 3), which has
been proven reliable for measuring participants’ trustworthiness
(Brandts and Charness, 2000; Ashraf et al., 2006). Such a role
reverse has also been demonstrated reliable for measuring trust
and trustworthiness (Charness and Rabin, 2002; Brandts and
Charness, 2011). Our participants were informed about how their
decisions determined their final payments: the game was played
only once with each participant randomly paired with another
participant and in the final stage of the experiment, the role each
participant played in this game was also randomly assigned by the
computer.
Risk game
We applied a risk game that simplified the design of Houser et al.
(2010) in our experiment. Our risk game was identical in form to
the trust game. The only difference between the trust game and
the risk game was that the repayment decision was determined
by human beings in the former, whereas it was determined by
a computer in the latter. There were also two roles in the risk
game: Player A (investor) and Player B (mediator). First, Player
A decided on an amount to transfer to Player B. Next, the
transferred amount was tripled, and Player B decided how much
of the tripled amount to transfer back to Player A. In contrast to
the trust game, all of our participants played the role of Player
A in the risk game, and the computer played the role of Player
B. For example, if the amount transferred by Player A is X, and
the amount transferred back by the Player B is Y, then Player A
will receive 10−X+Y, and Player B will receive 10+3X−Y. Our
participants were informed that Y would be randomly selected
by the computer as a number between zero and 3X.
After our participants passed two profit-calculating questions
to ensure they fully understood the game, each participant was
asked how much to transfer to Player B when playing the role of
Player A. The game was played only once. Our participants were
also informed about how their decisions determined their final
payments: in the final stage of the experiment, the payment in this
experimental game was determined according to the participants’
decisions and the decisions of the computer (the computer
playing Player B would randomly pick an integer between 1 and
3X to transfer back to Player A. In this case, each possible integer
value between 1 and 3X transferring back by the computer was
equal in probability).
When the participants completed the two tasks, they were
asked to complete a questionnaire before receiving their
payments. The questionnaire contained questions about personal
information, such as gender, age, and self-assessment of risk
preference, etc. Next, our participants were shown which roles
they played in each game and received their payments according
to their choices and the choices of their partners or the computer.
The exchange rate for game tokens and RMB yuan was 1:1, and
each participant received an extra 20 RMB yuan for participation.
Results
Behavioral Data
In the trust game, the amount transferred (trust investment)
in the role of the trustor indicated the participant’s trust.
The trust investment of each participant was defined as Trust
(the measure of trust). The average ratio of the individual’s
expectations of repayment for each investment in the trust
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FIGURE 3 | Sample screen in the step of repayment for the trust game. The participant playing the role of trustee had to decide the amounts sending back to
the trustor in every possible condition by inputting integers in the right ten rows.
game was defined as the ExpRatio. For example, assuming
that the expected repayment of the trustee was Exp1 when
the trustor invested 1 token, and the expected repayment was
Exp2 when 2 tokens were invested, etc., then, ExpRatio =
(Exp1/1+Exp2/2+Exp3/3...+Exp10/10)/10. In the risk game,
the amount transferred in the role of Player A was defined
as Risk (the measure of the participant’s risk preference). We
also collected the data of self-asserted risk preference of each
participant through questionnaire. There are 6 levels of risk
preference style from 0 (very risk averse) to 5 (very risk seeking).
The value of self-asserted risk preference was defined as SelfRisk.
Behavioral data were statistically evaluated using SPSS
software (version 22, SPSS Inc., Chicago, IL, USA). The
significance level was set at 0.05 for all analyses. We also
conducted the analyses of variance (ANOVAs) within a Bayesian
framework to test the evidence in favor of the null hypothesis
(Rouder et al., 2012, 2016; Wetzels et al., 2012), using
JASP software (version 0.8 Beta 5, University of Amsterdam,
Netherland).
First, we tested whether there was any sequence effect.
Although the sequences in our experiment were counterbalanced
across tDCS stimulations, Trust and Risk were analyzed via
ANOVA with tDCS stimulation type and sequence as between-
subject factors. There was no main effect of sequence on the
participants’ trust [F(1, 84)= 0.403, p= 0.527, ηp
2
= 0.005] or risk
[F(1, 84) = 0.021, p = 0.884, ηp
2
< 0.001]. The Bayesian analysis
also indicated that the behaviors of participants in the trust game
and the risk game were not influenced by the sequence, with
evidence in favor of a model without the sequence effect as
compared to a model including this factor (Trust: BFsequence =
0.271; Risk: BFsequence = 0.221).
Second, the observed results were similar to those of
previous studies. The correlation between Risk and Trust was
not significant in our anodal group participants (coefficient
= −0.105, p = 0.582, Pearson correlation), cathodal group
(coefficient = −0.060, p = 0.751, Pearson correlation), sham
group (coefficient = −0.185, p = 0.328, Pearson correlation)
or in the total sample including the three stimulation types
(coefficient = −0.119, p = 0.263, Pearson correlation). The
Bayesian analysis also indicated evidence in favor of the null
hypothesis (BFanodal = 0.262; BFcathodal = 0.238; BFsham =
0.358; BFtotal = 0.244). No significant correlation between Trust
and SelfRisk was observed either (Anodal: coefficient = 0.018,
p = 0.924; Cathodal: coefficient = −0.105, p = 0.579; Sham:
coefficient = 0.189, p = 0.318, Pearson correlation. BFanodal =
0.228; BFcathodal = 0.263; BFsham = 0.365). However, the
relationship between Risk and SelfRisk was significant in the
total sample (coefficient= 0.226, p= 0.032, Pearson correlation)
and in the sham group (coefficient = 0.421, p = 0.021, Pearson
correlation). The Bayesian analysis also showed limited evidence
in favor of the model with a correlation between participants’
risk and their self-asserted risk preference (BFsham = 5.788;
BFtotal = 2.472). Such a significant relationship between Risk
and SelfRisk was not observed in the anodal group (coefficient
= −0.078, p = 0.684, Pearson correlation; BFanodal = 0.246)
or in the cathodal group (coefficient = 0.204, p = 0.280,
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Pearson correlation; BFcathodal = 0.397), which indicates that
the anodal and cathodal stimulation may have altered the risk
preference of our participants. Moreover, data of self-asserted
risk preference were also analyzed by ANOVA with tDCS
stimulation type as a between-subject factor. No significant
effect of stimulation type was observed [F(2, 87) = 0.732, p
= 0.484, ηp
2
= 0.017; Anodal: mean = 2.333; Cathodal:
mean = 2.567; Sham: mean = 2.600], which indicates that the
tDCS stimulation has hardly any significant influence on the
participant’s self-asserted risk preference. There was a significant
relationship between the ExpRatio and Trust in the total sample
including the three stimulation types (coefficient = 0.442, p <
0.001, Pearson correlation). The Bayesian analysis also indicated
decisive evidence in favor of themodel with a correlation between
participants’ trust and their expectation of repayment (BFtotal =
1534). These results obviously indicate that those who expected
higher repayments exhibited more trust in the trust game.
Clearly, the expectation of repayment in the risk game is 1.5
tokens for each invested token, whereas themean ExpRatio of our
participants in the trust game was 1.379 tokens for each invested
token, which was significantly lower than the expectation in the
risk game [t(89) = −2.480, p = 0.015]. The Bayesian one sample
t-test also showed limited evidence in favor of the hypothesis that
the average ExpRatio was lower than 1.5 (BF= 4.155). The slight
difference between our participants’ expectations of repayment in
the trust and risk games may explain the phenomenon of betrayal
aversion (Bohnet and Zeckhauser, 2004; Bohnet et al., 2008) by
which the individuals invested more in the risk game than in the
trust game.
Effects of tDCS Over the rDLPFC on Trust
The investments of the trustors in the trust game in the anodal
and cathodal tDCS over the rDLPFC and sham groups were
analyzed by means of ANOVAs with tDCS stimulation type
(anodal, cathodal vs. sham) as a between-subject factor. No
significant effect of stimulation type was observed [F(2, 87) =
0.103, p = 0.902, ηp
2
= 0.002; Bayesian ANOVA also showed
that the model not including the stimulation type factor is 9.3
times more likely than the full model]. Moreover, we ran an
ANCOVA with stimulation type as a between-subject factor and
self-asserted risk, gender and age as covariates. No significant
effect of stimulation type was observed when we controlled the
factors of self-asserted risk preference, gender and age [F(2, 84) =
0.119, p = 0.888, ηp
2
= 0.003]. Bayesian ANCOVA also showed
that the model not including the stimulation type factor is 9.3
times more likely than the full model.
Effects of tDCS Over the rDLPFC on Risk
The investments in the risk game from the anodal and cathodal
tDCS over the rDLPFC and sham groups were analyzed by
means of ANOVAs with tDCS stimulation type (anodal, cathodal
vs. sham) as a between-subject factor. There was a significant
main effect of tDCS stimulation [F(2, 87) = 8.236, p < 0.001,
ηp
2
= 0.159; Bayesian ANOVA also favored the model including
the stimulation type with a factor of 56.4]. Post-hoc analyses
(Bonferroni) revealed that the risk preference in the anodal group
(mean= 5.20) was significantly lower than those obtained for the
sham group (mean = 7.17, p = 0.001) and the cathodal group
(mean = 7.07, p = 0.003). No significant difference between the
cathodal group and the sham group was observed (p = 0.982).
We also ran an ANCOVA with stimulation type as a between-
subject factor and self-asserted risk, gender and age as covariates.
A significant effect of stimulation type was also observed when
we controlled the factors of self-asserted risk preference, gender
and age [F(2, 84) = 8.517, p < 0.001, ηp
2
= 0.169]. Bayesian
ANCOVA also favored the model including the stimulation type
with a factor of 56.4. There was also a significant main effect of
age [F(1, 84) = 13.392, p < 0.001, ηp
2
= 0.138; BFage = 27.2],
indicating that younger participants seem to bemore risk-seeking
than elder ones.
Moreover, because the trust and the risk game are identical
except that the repayment decision was determined by human
beings in the former, whereas it was determined by computers in
the latter, we ran a repeated ANOVAwith task as a within-subject
factor and stimulation type as a between-subject factor. There
were significant main effects of task [F(1, 87) = 9.905, p = 0.002,
ηp
2
= 0.102; Bayesian ANOVA also favored the model including
the task factor with a factor of 33.9] and tDCS stimulation type
[F(2, 87) = 3.645, p = 0.030, ηp
2
= 0.077; Bayesian ANOVA
showed evidence in favor of the model with the stimulation type
and task factors, BF = 43.5]. Crucially, significant interaction
effects of task by stimulation type were observed [F(2, 87) = 3.435,
p = 0.037, ηp
2
= 0.073]. Bayesian repeated measures ANOVA
also showed that the model with the interaction factor is 70.0
times more likely than the model not including the interaction
factor (Figure 4).
Discussion
Trusting decisions involve “the willingness to increase one’s
vulnerability to another who’s behavior is not under one’s
control” (Zand, 1972), which is a type of social risk. Scholars
from various disciplines have argued that risk and trust are closely
related constructs (Ben-Ner and Putterman, 2001; Cook and
Cooper, 2003; Schechter, 2007), whereas other social scientists
have argued that risk and trust are different concepts with
various distribution patterns and distinct neural bases (McCabe
et al., 2001; Eckel and Wilson, 2004; Houser et al., 2010;
Fetchenhauer and Dunning, 2012; Aimone et al., 2014). No
significant relationship between trust and risk or between trust
and self-asserted risk was observed in the anodal, cathodal, or
sham groups, which adds evidence to the opinion that risk
preference is uncorrelated with trust decisions, revealing that risk
has little influence on participants’ investments in the trust game.
Neuroimaging studies have demonstrated that the rDLPFC is
of special importance for human executive function, especially in
selfish impulse control (Sanfey et al., 2003; Spitzer et al., 2007;
van den Bos et al., 2009). Previous neuroscience studies have
also revealed that the DLPFC is activated when trustees exhibit
more trustworthiness in the trust game (Chang et al., 2011;
Nihonsugi et al., 2015). The rDLPFC is relatively more activated
when individuals decide to trust their human counterparts than
when making risky decisions while facing a computer mediator
(McCabe et al., 2001; Aimone et al., 2014).
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FIGURE 4 | Data of investment in the trust game and the risk game.
Mean investment in the trust game and risk game across the stimulations over
the rDLPFC. The error bars indicate the 95% confidence intervals. The
asterisks indicate significant differences between treatments.
In the current study, we applied tDCS over the rDLPFC to
determine the influence of the rDLPFC on trust decisions. We
found that neither activating nor inhibiting the rDLPFC altered
the individuals’ trust investments, which indicates that changing
the excitability of the rDLPFCmight have no significant influence
over social risk decisions such as trust. Another tDCS study
also demonstrated that stimulation over the medial prefrontal
cortex does not alter interpersonal trust (Colzato et al., 2015).
Regarding trust behavior, many preferences, including altruism
(Cox, 2004; Ashraf et al., 2006; Altmann et al., 2008), betrayal
aversion (Bohnet and Zeckhauser, 2004; Bohnet et al., 2008) and
ambiguity (Corcos et al., 2012) have been proven to influence
individuals’ interpersonal trust levels. These different preferences
have various neural bases, which indicates that trust behavior
involve the cooperative activities of several brain areas. Solely
modulating a selfish impulse control brain region, such as the
rDLPFC, may not be sufficient to alter the interpersonal trust
levels of human beings.
FMRI studies have revealed that the neural activity of the
rDLPFC predicts individuals’ risk preferences. Using TMS,
Knoch et al. (2006) discovered that disrupting the rDLPFC leads
to riskier decision-making. Moreover, bilateral tDCS stimulation
studies have indicated that modulating the DLPFC alters
individuals’ risk preferences (Ye et al., 2015a,b), and activating
the rDLPFC induces more conservative choices relative to a
control group (Fecteau et al., 2007a,b). Unlike the repeated
gambling tasks that have been performed in previous studies,
we applied a one-shot risk game that imitates the form of the
trust game to test the robustness of the correlation between the
rDLPFC and individuals’ risk preferences in different risk-taking
tasks. Consistent with previous observations, a significant effect
of increasing the excitability of the rDLPFC on risky decision
making was observed. The participants who received anodal
stimulation exhibited more conservative behaviors than the
participants in the sham group. The observations also revealed
that the risk preference might be altered by tDCS stimulation
for the significant correlation between risk and self-asserted risk
diminished in the anodal and cathodal groups.
Although it has been revealed that anodal stimulation over
rDLPFC alters risk preference of participants in Experiment
1, one may argue that the more conservative behavior shown
in the anodal group was due to the cathodal stimulation over
visual cortex rather than the anodal stimulation over rDLPFC. To
further eliminate the possible tDCS stimulation effect over visual
cortex, a control experiment was performed (Experiment 2) to
rule out the influence of the visual cortex. In Experiment 2, we
tested one control group (hereafter referred as “control group”)
with the anodal electrode placed over rDLPFC and the cathodal
electrode placed over the contralateral cheek as a reference site
(Berryhill and Jones, 2012; Tseng et al., 2012; Lally et al., 2013;
Mai et al., 2016). This site was chosen because it is off of the head
and thus less likely to affect a response in the brain. Then, the
observations including trust and risk from the control sample
were compared with those from the sham group. If significant
differences were also observed between the participants’ risk
preference from the control group and those from the sham
group, we could conclude that the anodal stimulation effect
over risk preference in Experiment 1 could only be due to the
modulation of the specific target (rDLPFC) rather than to a
cathodal stimulation effect of the visual cortex.
EXPERIMENT 2
Materials and Methods
Subjects
A new sample of thirty healthy subjects (right-handed, with no
history of psychiatric problem, mean age 20.90 years, ranging
from 17 to 25 years; 16 females) participated in the study for
payment. As in Experiment 1, all participants had normal or
corrected-to-normal vision, were naïve to tDCS and the trust and
risk games, and gave their written informed consent. Participants
also received a written explanation of the tDCS and of any
possible adverse effects without any information about the type
of stimulation or the experimental hypotheses. The protocol was
approved by the Zhejiang University ethics committee.
Apparatus, Tasks, and Procedure
The apparatus, tasks, and procedure were exactly the same as
that in the Experiment 1 with the following exception. Since
the Experiment 2 served as a control to verify that the tDCS
stimulation effects observed in Experiment 1 are specific to
rDLPFC, we performed one control group with the anodal
electrode placed over rDLPFC, and the cathodal electrode placed
over the contralateral cheek. The participants were assigned to
receive anodal tDCS over rDLPFC (n = 30, 16 females), at the
F4 position according to the international EEG 10/20 system,
whereas the cathodal electrode was placed over the contralateral
cheek.
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Results and Discussion
Given that the participants received anodal stimulation over
rDLPFC with cathodal stimulation over the cheek as a control
group to verify that the more conservative behavior in anodal
group observed in the risk game in Experiment 1 was due to
the stimulation over rDLPFC, rather than the stimulation over
visual cortex, observations measuring trust and risk preference
from the control group were compared with those from the sham
group. As in Experiment 1, the investments of the trustors in
the trust game from the control and sham groups were analyzed
with ANOVAs with tDCS stimulation type (control vs. sham)
as a between-subject factor. No significant difference of the
investments of the trustors between the two groups was observed
[F(1, 58) = 0.010, p = 0.922, ηp
2
< 0.001; Bayesian ANOVA also
showed that the model not including the stimulation type factor
is 3.8 times more likely than the full model]. Moreover, we ran
an ANCOVA with stimulation type as a between-subject factor
and self-asserted risk, gender and age as covariates. No significant
effect of stimulation type was observed when we controlled these
factors [F(1, 55) = 0.135, p = 0.714, ηp
2
= 0.002]. Bayesian
ANCOVA also showed evidence in favor of the model without
the stimulation type factor (BFstimulation = 0.263).
Moreover, as in Experiment 1, the investments in the risk
game from the control and sham groups were analyzed with
ANOVAs with tDCS stimulation type (control vs. sham) as
a between-subjects factor. There was a significant main effect
of tDCS stimulation [F(1, 58) = 15.47, p < 0.001, ηp
2
=
0.211; Bayesian ANOVA also favored the model including the
stimulation type factor with a factor of 109.3]. The risk preference
in the control group (mean = 5.07) was significantly lower than
those obtained for the sham group (mean = 7.17, p < 0.001).
We also ran an ANCOVA with stimulation type as a between
subject factor and self-asserted risk, gender and age as covariates.
A significant effect of stimulation type was also observed whenwe
controlled the factors [F(1, 55) = 14.672, p < 0.001, ηp
2
= 0.211].
Bayesian ANCOVA also showed decisive evidence in favor of
the model including the stimulation type factor (BFstimulation =
109.3). We also ran a repeated ANOVA with task as a within-
subject factor and stimulation type as a between-subject factor.
Significant interaction effects of task by stimulation type were
also observed [F(1, 58) = 6.450, p= 0.014, ηp
2
= 0.100]. Bayesian
repeated measures ANOVA also showed that the model with
the interaction factor is 5.576 times more likely than the model
without the interaction factor (Figure 5).
The results of this experiment ruled out the possibility that the
altering of behaviors in the risk game observed in anodal rDLPFC
group of Experiment 1 were due to the stimulation effect over
visual cortex rather than activating the excitability of rDLPFC.
The results of Experiment 2 provide straightforward evidence
that the anodal tDCS stimulation effect in the risk game was due
to the modulation of rDLPFC.
CONCLUSIONS
In the present study, we re-examined the question of whether
trust is a type of risk-taking behavior that can be predicated
FIGURE 5 | Data of investment in the trust game and the risk game.
Mean investment in the trust game and risk game for the control and sham
groups. The error bars indicate the 95% confidence intervals. The asterisks
indicate significant differences between treatments.
by individuals’ non-social risk preferences. Our observations
revealed that activating the rDLPFC can induce less risky
behavior in a one-shot risk game and that this causal relationship
seems to be unique to non-social risk contexts because no
correlation between the rDLPFC and social risk preference in
the trust game was found. Our findings indicate that the trusting
behavior of individuals in a trust game has multiple driving
forces and results from the interaction of many neural regions.
Thus, trust is much more complicated than the risk preference
in human beings. We also found that interpersonal trust is not
the same as risk-taking behavior, and the potential neural basis
supporting cooperative decisions in the trust game remains to be
exploited.
One limitation of the current study is that only one potential
driving force of trust (for example, risk preference) has been
discussed while many other preferences, including altruism,
betrayal aversion, and ambiguity, which have been proven to
influence individuals’ interpersonal trust levels remain unknown.
Further studies may focus on these preferences respectively
to reveal the nature of trust. Another deficiency of our study
is that following many tDCS studies, the current intensity
of stimulation was set as 2 mA (see Sellaro et al., 2016
for a review), which does not necessarily increase efficacy of
stimulation, but may also shift the direction of excitability
alteration (Batsikadze et al., 2013). The distance between the
target brain area and the return electrode in our study is
also very large that selective stimulation of the target area
may not be guaranteed. These issues should be taken into
account for applications of the stimulation technique in future
studies.
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In summary, our findings add evidence to the argument that
trust is not exactly identical to risk preference. The influence of
tDCS over the rDLPFC is specific to non-social risk preference
but not social risk such as trust. Activating the rDLPFC with
tDCS can induce more conservative decisions in the risk game
without altering interpersonal trust investments. Our results
indicate that the rDLPFC is specific to the risk preferences of
individuals, and no tDCS stimulation effect on the interpersonal
trust of trustors was observed.
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